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ABSTRACT 
Recent “argumentative approaches” in the study of  reasoning are deemed by many to offer the 
most promising avenue in this field. Such approaches provide good theoretical grounds for the 
idea that reasoning is argumentative in nature and a large body of  evidence supporting it. My 
aim here is to examine to what extent the idea that reasoning is argumentative in nature, and 
its implications, have been developed by the main argumentative approaches to reasoning. I will 
then consider whether and how more could be done to elaborate upon these claims. As I will try 
to argue, in reducing the connection between reasoning and argumentation to the fact that 
reasoning produces convincing arguments, these approaches mainly highlight reasoning’s 
persuasive and therefore instrumental function. I then conclude by proposing an alternative 
argumentative conception of  rationality, outlined by Paul Grice and recently discussed by 
Marina Sbisà, which highlights reasoning’s reason-giving function. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Reasons matter in many situations of  one’s life, be they private or public. Anyone 
engaged in a dialogical situation is likely to want to provide reasons in support of  
her opinions and claims and to evaluate others’ reasons for their opinions and 
claims. In giving and evaluating reasons we engage in a reasoning process: we 
make connections between premises and conclusions and judge whether a certain 
set of  premises provides good reasons to accept a certain conclusion. By contrast 
with such a dialogic process we see that in today’s public debates, such as 
television political debates, opponents are engaged rather in exchanging 
“arguments” whose aim is to persuade one’s target audience, irrespective of  
whether such arguments are well-grounded. Since antiquity philosophers have 
been strongly interested in distinguishing between good and bad arguments; 
think, for example, of  Aristotle’s work on syllogistic reasoning in his Prior 
Analytics and Sophistical Refutations. As a matter of  fact, the study of  reasoning 
and argumentation has been central to philosophy and its branches ever since. In 
the last century, however, reasoning and argumentation have been studied 
independently by cognitive psychologists and argumentation theorists 
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respectively. While their lines of  research have been running in parallel, without 
addressing each others’ studies, for thirty years, they have recently been brought 
together thanks to the development of  argumentative approaches to reasoning in 
various fields of  research, particularly cognitive psychology and analytic 
philosophy. Such approaches provide good theoretical grounds for the idea that 
reasoning is argumentative in nature and a large body of  evidence supporting it. 
This may be taken to suggest that human rationality itself  has an essential 
connection to argumentation. My aim here is to examine to what extent the idea 
that reasoning is argumentative in nature, and its implications, have been 
developed by the main argumentative approaches to reasoning and whether and 
how more could be done to elaborate upon it. 
The paper unfolds as follows: In Section 2, I briefly describe the state of  the 
art in psychological studies on reasoning and in argumentation theory, and then 
turn to today’s most influential argumentative approaches to reasoning. In 
Section 3, I examine how rationality appears to be conceived in these approaches 
and conclude that by attributing a persuasive function to reasoning they assume 
an instrumental conception of  rationality. In Section 4, I argue that the reduction 
of  the argumentative function of  reasoning to that of  producing convincing 
arguments does not fit the project of  viewing reasoning as basically 
argumentative in nature. I conclude by presenting a conception of  rationality, 
outlined by Paul Grice (1991; 2001) and recently discussed by Marina Sbisà (2006; 
2007), that, in my view, may account for the argumentative nature of  reasoning 
by highlighting its reason-giving function. 
 
 
2. Argumentative approaches to reasoning 
 
Reasoning and argumentation have been studied by different research traditions 
over time.  
On the one side, in the last few decades reasoning has been the subject of  
intensive psychological and philosophical investigation. In this interdisciplinary 
field of  research, a great deal of  interest has been directed towards the results of  
experimental studies on how people actually reason. These studies show that 
people systematically depart from the standard models of  rationality, i.e. 
deductive logic, standard probability theory and expected utility theory, failing to 
solve even very simple reasoning tasks, such as assessing the logical validity of  an 
argument, deciding what evidence one needs to test a conditional rule, estimating 
the posterior probability of  a hypothesis on the basis of  the evidence provided, 
and so on (see, e.g., Gilcovich, Griffin and Kahneman 2002). Some psychologists 
initially held that, on the basis of  the evidence collected, people may be regarded 
as basically irrational. However, in the current debate, leading theories, especially 
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evolutionary, ecological and dual-system theories, maintain that reasoning which 
seems to be irrational can be judged as being perfectly rational, on the condition 
that it is evaluated according to the appropriate normative standards, such as 
evolutionary or ecological ones (see respectively Cosmides and Tooby 1992; 
Gigerenzer 2000; Evans and Over 1996; Stanovich 1999). 
On the other side, argumentation has been widely studied by logicians and 
linguists. In current studies on argumentation, two main strands of  research can 
be identified, which focus on argument-as-product and argumentation-as-process 
respectively. The first strand of  research, which carries on the works of  Chaim 
Perelman and those of  Stephen Toulmin (see respectively Perelman and 
Olbrechts-Tyteca 1958; Toulmin 1958), aims to identify and evaluate the 
structures of  arguments occurring in ordinary conversation on the basis of  
(depending on the theory at hand) their persuasiveness, appropriateness, relevance 
and so on. This strand of  research includes, among others, approaches to 
argumentation such as informal logic (for an overview see Johnson and Blair 2000) 
and critical thinking (see, e.g., Ennis 1962; Siegel 1988). Frans van Eemeren and 
Rob Grootendorst’s pragma-dialectical theory and Douglas Walton’s New 
Dialectic are the leading theories of  the second line of  research (see respectively 
van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004; Walton 1998). Both these theories study 
argumentation as a discourse activity. While the pragma-dialectical theory 
considers argumentation as a “complex speech act aimed at convincing a 
reasonable critic” (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004, 2), New Dialectic 
maintains that arguments should be assessed according to different standards 
depending on the types of  dialogue in which they occur. 
There have been only few attempts to study reasoning and argumentation 
jointly, particularly in the psychological domain: while argumentation theorists 
usually acknowledge that reasoning is related in some ways to argumentation, 
psychological studies on reasoning as traditionally conceived consider reasoning to 
be an inner mental activity aimed at forming true beliefs (epistemic rationality) 
and maximizing one’s personal utility (practical rationality). Recently, however, 
some scholars, in fields such as cognitive psychology and analytic philosophy, have 
argued that reasoning and argumentation are so strictly related that the former 
cannot be studied detached from its place of  occurrence, that is, dialogical, 
argumentative situations, regardless of  whether reasoning is considered to be 
cognitive or social (see Haidt 2001; Hahn and Oaskford 2006; 2007; Mercier and 
Sperber 2011a; Dutilh Novaes 2013). Particularly, if  reasoning is so conceived, 
some of  the so-called biases found in psychological experiments concerning 
reasoning can be reassessed as effective argumentative moves or be shown to be 
due to factors other than people’s supposed poor reasoning competencies, such as 
the particular conditions in which they are asked to reason, their lack of  
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acquaintance with particular dialogical and argumentative practices, their initial 
conviction in the claim corresponding to the conclusion of  the argument (e.g., in 
the case of  belief  bias effect) and so on. In what follows, I will present the four 
theories that have contributed to the development of  this new field of  research in 
the last years. 
 
2.1. The argumentative theory of  reasoning 
 
Hugo Mercier and Dan Sperber have recently proposed a psychological theory of  
reasoning, which connects reasoning with argumentation, labeled the 
“argumentative theory of  reasoning”. According to them, “the emergence of  
reasoning is best understood within the framework of  the evolution of  human 
communication” (Mercier and Sperber 2011a, 60). In their view, reasoning has 
evolved not to help people getting better at thinking on their own, but to provide 
arguments supporting their claims and to evaluate those provided by their 
interlocutors in dialogical contexts. In Mercier and Sperber’s words, “reasoning 
has evolved and persisted mainly because it makes human communication more 
effective and advantageous” (Mercier and Sperber 2011a, 60): its main function is 
to successfully change our interlocutors’ minds and to acquire reliable information 
from them, limiting the risk of  being misled. 
As to the workings of  reasoning, Mercier and Sperber maintain that in our 
minds two different kinds of  inferential activity take place, which they call 
respectively intuitive and reflective inferences, and that only the latter amounts to 
full-fledged reasoning. While intuitive inferences are the result of  the inferential 
processes carried out by the domain-specific cognitive modules composing the 
human mind, reflective inferences are the indirect output of  one of  these modules, 
the so-called “argumentative module”. Intuitive inferences are so ubiquitous that 
they are considered to be unconscious and uncontrollable, taking place silently at 
a sub-personal level. When we are conscious of  having reached a certain 
conclusion, but not of  the inferential process that has led to it, we say that an 
intuitive inference has taken place since we are not aware of  the reasons 
supporting its conclusion. However, we rarely question whether intuitive 
conclusions are well-grounded or not, since we consider what comes from the 
workings of  our minds as perfectly reliable, and so we accept such conclusions as 
they appear in our consciousness. When activated, the argumentative module, as 
any other mental module, generates intuitive inferences, which are, however, of  a 
special kind, because they amount to intuitive representations about whether a 
certain conclusion is well supported by the reasons provided to accept it (that is, 
its premises and their connection with that conclusion). Since the argumentative 
module provides representations about the connection between premises and 
conclusions, which are themselves representations, Mercier and Sperber take it to 
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be a metarepresentational mechanism. Starting from the outputs of  the 
argumentative module, reflective inferences, which, as said before, amount to full-
fledged reasoning, take place when we “accept a conclusion because of  an 
argument in its favor that is intuitively strong enough [...]”, “construct a complex 
argument by linking argumentative steps, each of  which we see as having 
sufficient intuitive strength [...], and “verbally produce the argument so that 
others will see its intuitive force and will accept its conclusion [...]” (Mercier and 
Sperber 2011a, 59): in so doing, we can be said to be conscious (at least, to a 
certain extent) of  the reasons for drawing a certain conclusion and of  their 
relationship. Characterized in this way, reasoning is taken to have enabled humans 
to argue with each other, thus serving a fundamental social, but also cognitive, 
function. 
According to Mercier and Sperber’s evolutionary hypothesis, reasoning has 
evolved and persisted until today just because its function has been that of  
facilitating humans to argue for their claims and to evaluate each others’ 
arguments. Particularly, it facilitates our ways of  giving and evaluating reasons in 
dialogical situations where people, while disagreeing, are disposed to change their 
opinions when good arguments are presented. On the contrary, when one is 
thinking on one’s own (and does not take into account other perspectives), or takes 
part in non-deliberating groups, that is, groups in which people are not interested 
in comparing their opinions with those of  their interlocutors, reasoning will be not 
helpful. As suggested by Mercier and Sperber (2011a, 63-66), in such cases people 
exhibit the so-called “confirmation bias”, that is, the tendency to favour evidence 
that supports their own opinions, leading to a strong reinforcement of  their 
attitudes. When this happens, we can observe well-known phenomena such as 
individual and group polarization. By contrast, argumentative moves inspired by 
the confirmation bias can be taken to be effective when they occur in deliberating 
groups because they offer people with evidence in support of  their claims, in view 
of  attacks or criticisms on the part of  an opponent. More generally, according to 
Mercier and Sperber most of  the failures in reasoning tasks are not caused by 
people’s poor reasoning competencies but depend on the abnormal conditions in 
which they are asked to reason, if  compared with the function according to which 
reasoning has evolved to serve. Experimental subjects are indeed asked to reason 
in isolation without the possibility of  genuinely debating with others. 
 
2.2. The dialogical nature of  deductive reasoning 
 
While Mercier and Sperber study reasoning in general, arguing for its evolutionary 
origins in argumentative contexts, Catarina Dutilh Novaes (2013) focuses on our 
ability to reason deductively and its relationship to argumentation, claiming that 
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deductive reasoning should be seen as a cultural product, not as an heritage of  
human evolution. According to Dutilh Novaes there are good historically and 
psychologically grounded reasons to take deductive reasoning to be a particular 
form of  argumentative practice, and so she argues that we should not see people 
as innately equipped with deductive skills, but rather that they acquire them 
thanks to specific training, particularly in the context of  formal schooling. Dutilh 
Novaes (2013, 461) asserts that, while deductive logic has emerged as a specific 
way of  arguing and debating since ancient Greece, in the last three centuries, 
particularly after the spread of  Kant’s critical philosophy, there has been a wide 
agreement that its rules play a normative role in our mental activity, internalizing 
them into the human mind. In her view there are two basic components on which 
deductive reasoning is grounded, which may be said to be argumentative in 
nature: “(1) the willingness to reason from premises regardless of  one’s doxastic 
attitude towards them; (2) the formulation of  indefeasible arguments, where the 
premises necessitate the truth of  the conclusion” (Dutilh Novaes 2013, 461). Seen 
in this way, deductive reasoning represents a particular form of  adversarial 
dialogue in which a proponent puts forward an argument so as to prompt her 
opponent to accept its conclusion if  she accepts its premises. In this dialogical 
situation, although proponent and opponent start by agreeing on some 
statements, acknowledging them as the premises of  the argument, the former 
aims to show that the claim she supports follows from these premises necessarily, 
while the latter tries to find counterexamples to this claim, that is, cases in which 
the premises hold but the conclusion does not, thus undermining the conclusion. 
Obviously, by formulating an indefeasible argument the proponent is almost 
certain to beat her opponent because, provided that the latter accepts the 
premises of  the argument, she must accept the conclusion that follow from them 
necessarily: as a matter of  fact, in a valid deductive argument the truth of  the 
premises makes the truth of  the conclusion necessary. 
In support of  her socio-cultural account of  the origins of  deductive reasoning, 
Dutilh Novaes provides evidence about its historical emergence and the ways in 
which one can get acquainted with its two basic components.  
From a historical point of  view, studies on the origins of  deductive logic 
suggest that a crucial role in its development has been played by debating 
practices which emerged in the early Academy and were developed and formalized 
in Aristotle’s Prior Analytics (see Dutilh Novaes 2013, 461-62). As suggested by 
Dutilh Novaes, both components of  deductive logic can be found in such 
dialectical practices. While (1) amounts to the traditional move of  granting the 
opponent’s premises “for the sake of  the argument”, (2) is concerned with drawing 
a conclusion from a set of  mutually accepted premises in light of  the property of  
truth-preservation which characterizes deductive arguments. 
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From a developmental perspective, Dutilh Novaes holds that the emergence of  
deductive skills depends upon people’s engagement with specific dialogical and 
argumentative practices, which they learn to master in the context of  formal 
schooling. As to the component (1) of  deductive logic, she makes reference to the 
work of  Sylvia Scribner (1977), according to whom one way (among many) that 
schooled people differ from unschooled people is that the former are more prone to 
draw conclusions from premises that are not in line with their beliefs and 
experiences, since in class situations they learn to accept teachers’ statements as 
true in order to reason with them. By contrast, as suggested by Luria’s pioneering 
studies on Uzbekistan peasants’ deductive skills (see Luria 1974), unschooled 
people are normally not disposed to reason leaving aside their own beliefs and 
experience and so refuse to draw conclusions from unfamiliar premises. While 
component (i) depends on the acquisition of  what Sylvia Scribner characterizes as 
an analytic orientation in one’s mode of  thinking, the ability to formulate 
indefeasible arguments requires stronger training, e.g. by learning to make 
mathematical demonstrations. Interestingly, Dutilh Novaes (2013, 477) maintains 
that formulating an indefeasible argument can “[…] be seen as a specific 
‘language game’ that must be learned to be played correctly”: only when engaged 
in such a language game, we are interested in whether our interlocutors have 
presented a deductively valid argument, that is, an argument in which, if  all of  its 
premises are true, then its conclusion must be true also, since when engaged in a 
discussion we normally only expect to deal with plausible arguments. However, 
Dutilh Novaes (2013, 476-79) underscores that there are also other social practices 
such as pretence play, storytelling and betting, which, while being not connected 
with school teaching, may help to improve schooled, as well as unschooled, 
people’s acquaintance with the two basic components of  deductive logic: 
particularly, by engaging in pretence play and storytelling one may learn to 
assume premises regardless of  her doxastic attitude towards them, while by 
engaging in betting one is exposed to adversarial communication, which is a key 
ingredient for formulating indefeasible arguments. 
 
2.3 Jonathan Haidt on moral reasoning 
 
Nearly fifteen years ago, Jonathan Haidt developed what he calls the “social 
intuitionist model of  moral judgment”, which has become in few years one of  the 
most prominent and debated approaches to moral judgments in the field of  moral 
psychology. Although his theory is not concerned primarily with reasoning, his 
way of  conceiving moral reasoning has been very influential in the development 
of  the argumentative approaches to reasoning. In contrast with the traditional 
model, according to which moral judgments are the result of  one’s conscious 
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reasoning activity, Haidt holds that moral judgments, with few exceptions, are 
caused by “quick moral intuitions” (Haidt 2001, 817). In his view, our minds 
possess intuitive heuristics which give rise to specific affective reactions (i.e., 
good/bad or like/dislike judgments) when we are asked to judge moral issues or 
cases. Such judgments, which are evaluative with regards people’s actions or 
characters “[...] are made with respect to a set of  virtues held to be obligatory by 
a culture or subculture” (Haidt 2001, 817). For example, following one of  Haidt’s 
examples, an act of  incest evokes a sense of  revulsion in people because they 
intuitively find some wrong with it (see Haidt 2001, 814). However, they do not 
know how they have arrived at such a judgment because it appears suddenly and 
effortlessly in their consciousness. 
Consider now moral reasoning. According to Haidt, we engage in reasoning 
only when a justification is required to give public support to our moral 
judgments. In such cases, using Haidt’s own metaphor, we become lawyers trying 
to build a case rather than judges searching for the truth (Haidt 2001, 814). In 
particular, moral reasoning is taken to be an effortful and conscious process which 
is performed after a moral judgment is made, to give a post hoc justification in 
support of  it (see Haidt 2001, 822-823). Since such post hoc justifications are 
directed at one’s interlocutors, moral reasoning can be also performed to influence 
their moral intuitions (and hence their moral judgments). However, what 
influences others’ intuitions is not the validity or goodness of  the arguments put 
forward to support our own moral judgments, but rather their capacity to activate 
“[…] new affectively valenced intuitions in the listener” (Haidt 2001, 819). 
Interestingly, according to Haidt there do exist (a few) cases in which moral 
judgments are caused by reasoning: that happens, for example, when intuitions 
are in conflict or when a deeper examination of  the moral case or issue in question 
is required by the social context in which we are involved (see Haidt 2001, 820). 
Furthermore, in some occasions we may reason privately but, as he observes, 
solitary moral reasoning is not very effective in overriding our initial intuitive 
judgments, since we rarely reason in order to question our attitudes or beliefs. 
When the overriding takes place, it is because “[…] the initial intuition is weak 
and processing capacity is high” (Haidt 2001, 819). By contrast, most of  the time 
we falsely believe that we have changed our minds thanks to conscious reasoning, 
while what we assume to be a reasoned change in view is caused by other social or 
affective factors (see Haidt 2001, 823). 
In summary, according to Haidt, intuition is the default mode of  thinking in 
the moral domain, giving rise to moral judgments which are rapid, effortless and 
easy. Moral reasoning occurs in two different ways: while its standard use is to give 
justificatory support to pre-existing moral judgments, in other cases we rely on 
moral reasoning, or believe ourselves to have relied on it, in order to derive moral 
judgments. However, accepting uncritically our own moral intuitions is not always 
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the best way of  approaching moral cases or issues. As suggested by Jonathan 
Baron (1998), there is strong evidence that when people trust their own intuitions 
their resulting decisions, particularly in public policy’s issues, can lead to 
disastrous consequences (see Haidt 2001, 815). So, Haidt’s theory is concerned 
with how moral judgments are made, but not with whether they are well-
grounded. In this sense, it is neutral about whether moral judgments caused by 
moral intuitions are better than those derived by reasoning. 
 
 
 
2.4. The Bayesian approach to argument strength 
 
While the previous argumentative approaches to reasoning are all descriptive, not 
taking a position on whether a specific instance of  argument can be said to be 
well-grounded or not, Ulrike Hahn and Mike Oaksford (2006; 2007) develop a 
Bayesian framework for assessing argument strength, which is clearly normative.1 
This framework is supposed to account for and predict the capacity of  reasons to 
weaken or strength the audience’s degree of  conviction in the claims which are 
taken to be supported by them.  
Since in ordinary life arguments are presented to convince the audience of  a 
certain standpoint, in order to evaluate them as good or bad we should determine 
the audience’s ultimate degree of  conviction in the proposition expressed in the 
standpoint, that is, their degree of  conviction after the argument put forward to 
support the standpoint has been presented. It is clear, however, that the same 
argument may be convincing for one interlocutor but not for another, in light of  
their prior conviction in its conclusion. Therefore, according to Hahn and 
Oaksford (2007, 706-707) what matters in such situations is the degree of  change 
caused by the argument in the audience, which they call the force or strength of  
the argument. Force or strength is distinguished from convincingness, which is 
characterized as the ultimate degree of  conviction in the claim supported by such 
an argument. Interestingly, Hahn and Oaksford hold that both degree of  
conviction and degree of  force can be quantified within a Bayesian framework. 
Within such a framework, an argument is taken to be composed by a claim, 
amounting to the hypothesis to be tested, and some reasons supporting it, which 
are the relevant pieces of  evidence available. If  we think of  claim and reasons as 
associated to probabilities, interpreted as one’s subjective degrees of  belief  that 
                                            
1 Hahn e Oaksford’s account is strictly connected with the Bayesian approach to human 
reasoning and rationality that Oaksford itself, with the collaboration of  Nick Chater (see, e.g., 
Oaksford and Chater 2007), has developed over the last twenty years on the basis of  John R. 
Anderson’s work on rational analysis (see Anderson 1990). 
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the claim is true, thanks to Bayes’ Theorem we can quantify the audience’s degree 
of  confidence in the claim after the reasons which are put forward to support it 
have been presented. This hence determines the audience’s ultimate degree of  
conviction (its convincingness), which amounts to the posterior probability of  the 
claim being true.2 As when new relevant evidence is presented the degree of  belief  
in an hypothesis may be strengthened or weakened, the same happens when 
reasons are presented in support of  a claim. Since the degree of  confirmation 
provided by new relevant evidence is characterized as the difference between the 
posterior and prior probability of  a hypothesis, the force or strength of  an 
argument can be described as the discrepancy between the prior conviction in the 
claim (the audience’s initial conviction in the claim) and the ultimate degree of  
conviction in it (the audience’s conviction in the claim after the argument has 
been presented). 
As Hahn and Oaksford underline, the same argument can have different 
strength in light of  the audience to which it is directed. To determine how 
convincing the argument is, indeed, we must take into account the audience’s 
initial conviction in the claim at issue (its prior subjective probability), the 
qualities of  the reasons put forward to support it (e.g. the trustworthiness of  their 
sources) and the relationship between the claim and such reasons, as Bayes’ 
Theorem clearly suggests when applied to hypothesis-testing cases. According to 
Bayes’ Theorem, indeed, the higher the degree of  belief  in an hypothesis, the 
higher is the likelihood that the evidence we have in its favour is the case when the 
hypothesis is true as opposed to false. Hahn and Oaksford claim that thanks to 
their Bayesian framework phenomena, such as the acceptance of  fallacies and the 
persuasiveness of  some types of  messages, can be accounted for. According to 
their analysis, an argument is said to be fallacious not because of  its structure, as 
traditional work on fallacies has assumed, but because it occupies “[…] the 
extreme weak end of  the argument strength spectrum given the probabilistic 
quantities involved” (Hahn and Oaksford 2007, 725). 
In support of  their Bayesian framework, Hahn and Oaskford have provided a 
body of  experimental evidence suggesting that people’s normative intuitions 
about argument strength, particularly fallacious arguments, appears to be 
consistent with those derived from their analysis (see Hahn and Oaksford 2006; 
2007). As a consequence, this theory can be said to be normative not only in the 
sense that it provides a normative framework for assessing argument strength but 
also because it can predict people’s judgments about how convincing an argument 
is. Obviously this does not mean that people are “Bayesian evaluators”: rather, it 
                                            
2 Stated in terms of  hypothesis testing, Bayes’ Theorem specifies how a hypothesis should be 
revised in the light of  new relevant evidence. 
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is the Bayesian framework aims to reflect their evaluations of  the strength of  
arguments. 
 
 
3. What kind of  rationality is assumed by the argumentative approaches to reasoning? 
 
While differing substantially from one another, all the above-described theories 
agree that the function of  reasoning should be rethought, converging on the idea 
that reasoning is argumentative in nature. In so doing, they assume, at least 
implicitly, that a distinction should be made between immediate, automatic 
inferences, which take place at a sub-personal level, and full-fledged reasoning, 
which instead involves the ability to consciously provide reasons in support of  
one’s claims. Although this distinction may seem to be merely a matter of  
terminology, it has a strong impact on the way that reasoning is studied 
empirically. Traditionally cognitive psychologists consider subjects’ responses in 
experimental tasks, which are supposed to require reasoning activity to be solved, 
as determined by some inferential processes. They then debate how these alleged 
inferential processes can be appropriately described. In the long run, this way of  
studying reasoning has led cognitive psychologists to consider any cognitive 
process that is supposed to be inferential, particularly well-known heuristics 
processes, as an instance of  reasoning. As a consequence, human reasoning has 
been taken to be a self-centered cognitive activity which is performed privately 
within one’s mind. Over the last decades or so, however, things have been 
gradually shifting away from focusing exclusively on subjects’ responses to 
focusing also on their ways of  justifying such responses has been made. As 
highlighted by Jos Hornikx and Ulrike Hahn (2012, 229) 
 
there is ample evidence […] that attempts to understand our ‘reasoning’ 
ability—that is, our ability to evaluate individual premise–conclusion 
connections—must take into account that, in our everyday lives, such 
reasoning is typically embedded in broader argumentative contexts […].  
 
If  reasoning is typically done interpersonally, taking place in “broader 
argumentative contexts”, its function should be found within its place of  
occurrence. As experimental data reported by Mercier and Sperber (2011a) 
suggest, many reasoning tasks, in which people tend to give wrong answers if  
approached in isolation, are more frequently solved correctly when they are 
presented to groups and the participants are asked to discuss their solutions 
collectively. Therefore reasoning may be deemed to have its natural environment 
in argumentation. Consider in particular the two following experimental findings. 
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As reported by Mercier and Sperber (2011a, 61), when taken in isolation subjects 
are not usually able to apply nor recognize the well-known modus tollens (if  p then 
q, not-q, so not-p), despite the fact that it is the simplest argument form after the 
modus ponens. However, if  asked to engage in argumentative dialogues 
participants have been shown to recognize and easily apply modus tollens in order 
to question the claims made by their opponents. Similarly, although only about 
10% of  subjects solve the standard version of  the selection task correctly, if  asked 
to discuss its solution with others about the 70% of  the subjects give the correct 
response (Moshman and Geil 1998). These and other similar experimental results 
(for a review see Mercier and Sperber 2011a, 61-66) suggest that reasoning works 
better when performed in argumentative contexts because it is set to serve 
argumentative ends. But what does it mean “to serve argumentative ends”? 
Mercier and Sperber’s approach, as well as the other argumentative approaches we 
have examined above, fail to give a clear answer to this question. Saying that 
reasoning has an argumentative function may be interpreted in (at least) two 
different ways: it may amount to the attribution of  a persuasive function or of  a 
reason-giving one. According to Mercier and Sperber (2011b, 96), reasoning 
produces convincing arguments to change other people’s minds, enabling us to 
achieve desirable effects in them. We can therefore assume that according to their 
theory, reasoning, in argumentative contexts, plays a persuasive function. We 
cannot say anything about whether Dutilh Novaes attributes a persuasive or a 
reason-giving function to our ability to reason “in general”, because she is 
interested exclusively in deductive reasoning conceived as a dialectical practice. 
We do know, however, that according to her, we can put opponents on our side 
thanks to this practice, insofar as we can show that the claim supported by us 
follows necessarily from some mutually shared premises. As a consequence, we can 
assume that she acknowledges a persuasive function to deductive reasoning as a 
dialectical practice. Haidt’s approach to moral reasoning has an ambiguous 
position as to the function of  reasoning. According to Haidt, reasoning helps us to 
justify our intuitive judgments to others by providing post-hoc rationalizations of  
these judgments. At first sight, his theory can be taken to attribute a reason-
giving function to reasoning, since it focuses on people’s efforts in justifying their 
already-made judgments. However, Haidt also holds that in justifying an already-
made judgment we usually aim at convincing our audience that this judgment is 
well-grounded, irrespective of  whether it may be or not, by activating “new 
affectively valenced intuitions” in them (Haidt 2001, 819). In other words, 
according to him reasoning plays a fundamental role in our attempts to influence 
others’ moral intuitions, which amounts to recognizing it as having a persuasive 
function. Putting together the two characterizations provided by Haidt, we can 
say that the persuasive function prevails over the reason-giving function because 
he strongly stresses the role of  reasoning in “convincing” and “influencing” one’s 
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audience. Lastly, in Hahn and Oaskford’s Bayesian framework, it is taken for 
granted that we reason to convince others of  our standpoints and so their theory 
is also based on the idea that reasoning has a persuasive function. In sum, 
according to all these approaches, reasoning, be it a cognitive or a social activity, is 
taken to be a strategic instrument that makes us competitive when confronted 
with other arguers. It can be said to be strategic, because through it we can 
achieve valuable goals, such as convincing others of  our standpoints or defending 
ourselves from their similar attempts, that might otherwise be too difficult or even 
impossible to achieve with other cognitive or social instruments. 
Not only are the supporters of  these approaches not too clear about the 
function of  reasoning, but they also set aside the question of  how the connection 
between reasoning and argumentation should be brought to bear on the 
characterisation of  rationality. On the basis of  what we have seen so far, however, 
we can assume that these approaches take for granted that rationality focuses on 
means-end relations: we are rational because we are equipped with reasoning, 
which can be inherited genetically or acquired through experience or education, 
and thanks to which we produce convincing arguments for changing the others’ 
minds. It is, in other words, an instrumental conception of  rationality. Indeed, 
insofar as reasoning is taken to be a good instrument, be it cognitive or social, to 
convince others to change their minds, the above-described argumentative 
approaches attribute an instrumental value to it. The value of  reasoning is 
derivative on the value which people attribute to changing other people’s minds. 
If  people had never been interested in changing other people’s minds, or if  
providing them with arguments would not have proven to be a good means to this 
end, reasoning would not have become a permanent component of  our cognitive 
or social repertoire. Similarly, if  people had found an alternative, easier and more 
effective way of  changing other people’s minds, reasoning would have been left 
aside and replaced by this alternative method. In sum, according to this 
instrumental conception the effectiveness of  reasoning amounts to its capacity to 
lead our audience to believe our opinions and claims: by relying on it we, both as 
proponents and opponents, aim at achieving the best results in competitive, 
dialogical situations. It should be noted that while this position can be attributed 
to Mercier and Sperber and to Hahn and Oaksford in a strong sense, it belongs to 
Dutilh Novaes and to Haidt only in a weaker one. As stated previously, in focusing 
on deductive reasoning, Dutilh Novaes can be taken to ascribe an instrumental 
function to it, but she does not take any stance as to the origins of  our “general” 
ability to reason or on why reasoning has evolved. As to Haidt’s approach to 
moral reasoning, we can assume that it is grounded on an instrumental conception 
of  rationality only insofar as, in it, the persuasive function prevails over the 
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reason-giving one. However, a tendency to conceive rationality in instrumental 
terms is shared by all the four approaches. 
 
 
4. Argumentative rationality 
 
By focusing upon the persuasive function of  reasoning, the above-described 
argumentative approaches do not fully develop the implications of  the connection 
between reasoning and argumentation. While there can be two different ways of  
conceiving the function of  reasoning, as either a persuasive or a reason-giving 
function, they stick to the former and, in so doing, appear to presuppose an 
instrumental conception of  rationality. According to this conception, giving 
justificatory support to one’s moves is not valuable per se but only insofar as it 
succeeds in convincing other people of  one’s opinions and claims. The question is 
then whether this way of  conceiving rationality fits the project of  viewing 
reasoning as basically argumentative in nature. Insofar as the argumentative 
function of  reasoning is equated to its capacity to produce convincing arguments 
that influence or change other people’s minds, reasoning works as a persuasive 
device whose aim is to achieve goals which people find valuable. But in doing so, 
the argumentative approaches lose the opportunity given by the connection 
between reasoning and argumentation to detach the former from the 
individualistic function which has been traditionally attributed to it by 
philosophers and psychologists. This can be clearly seen in Mercier and Sperber’s 
position. On the one hand, they criticize the traditional, individualistic conception 
of  reasoning, holding that reasoning is not merely strategic in the sense of  helping 
us, as individual reasoners, to enhance our knowledge and to maximize our 
personal utilities, but because it helps us to produce convincing arguments when 
challenged in dialogical contexts. On the other hand, by holding that, thanks to 
their ability to reason, people “[...] argue for whatever it is advantageous to them 
to have their audience believe” (Mercier and Sperber 2011b, 96), Mercier and 
Sperber assume that our ways of  reasoning depend on what is advantageous to us, 
that is, pursue our own goals and interests. Reasoning therefore appears to be 
understood by them to be an instrument serving the achievement of  our personal 
utilities after all. Thus the supporters of  argumentative approaches trace the 
argumentative nature of  reasoning back to the purely individualistic component 
of  dialogical situations, that is, the goal of  achieving personal advantages from 
them. 
In contrast to this instrumental conception, there is another route one may 
want to take in elaborating the idea that reasoning is argumentative in nature. If  
one takes the reason-giving function of  reasoning to be more fundamental than its 
persuasive function, one can avoid assuming an instrumental conception of  
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rationality and look for a thoroughly argumentative alternative. Indeed, an 
argumentative conception of  rationality inspired by Paul Grice’s later works (see 
Grice 1991; 2001) appears to be a good fit to account for the argumentative nature 
of  reasoning. 
A preliminary distinction that must be established here is that between one’s 
ability to reason, that is, the ability to make premises-conclusions connections, 
and that of  producing convincing arguments, which amounts to the ability to 
change people’s minds about anything. These abilities are clearly independent of  
each other: on the one hand, one may be very good at making premises-
conclusions connections, but not necessarily interested in using this ability to 
produce arguments to convince other people and, on the other, one can succeed in 
convincing other people with what one says without relying on one’s ability to 
make premises-conclusions connections. Although argumentative approaches, 
most explicitly Mercier and Sperber’s argumentative theory of  reasoning, conflate 
these two abilities into a more general ability to argue, they might have developed 
for very different reasons, not necessarily linked to one another. Moreover, our 
ability to argue is much more complicated than the supporters of  argumentative 
approaches assume. Not only we acquire deductive skills thanks to specific 
training, as suggested by Dutilh Novaes, but also our ability to argue, which does 
not coincide with our ability to reason, depends on our acquaintance with specific 
social practices, which involve, among other things, rules and expectations that 
guide our behavior when engaged in these practices. As suggested by 
argumentation theorists (cf. Grootendorst, van Eemeren 2004; Walton 1998), these 
rules and expectations involve, among other things, attributions of  entitlement, 
undertakings of  commitments, turn-taking, ways of  questioning each others’ 
claims, adoption of  standards of  precision, and so on. When people do not respect 
the rules characterizing such practices and are not guided by expectations as to 
how to proceed when engaged in them, they are engaged in a practice, which may 
be similar, but not identical, to that of  arguing. Obviously, it is a necessary, but 
not sufficient, condition to be engaged in argumentative practices that one should 
be able to make premises-conclusions connections. In reasoning, indeed, we make 
connections between premises and conclusions and judge whether a certain set of  
premises constitutes good reasons to accept a certain conclusion. This is what can 
be called the reason-giving function of  reasoning. While it is true that if  one is 
willing to be engaged in an argumentative practice, one needs to rely on the ability 
to reason, it is also true that someone may be interested in giving reasons in 
support of  a certain claim or decision anytime it seems relevant to do so, without 
any particular further goal (such as that of  convincing others of  something). 
However, since we can be interested in justifying our moves in a variety situations, 
be they public (speaking with others) or private (such as engaging in an inner 
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dialogue with ourselves), the reason-giving function of  reasoning may be 
considered as primarily communicative. Obviously, this function of  reasoning can 
be exploited to convince others of  a certain claim or opinion, and thus become 
part of  a more complex social situation, which may be adversarial or cooperative. 
At this point, it is useful to recall Paul Grice’s characterization of  human 
rationality as: “a concern that one’s moves are justified and a capacity (to some 
degree) to give effect to that concern” (Sbisà 2006, 241-242; see Grice 1991, 82-83), 
which has been taken by Marina Sbisà (2006; 2007) to express an argumentative 
conception of  rationality (as opposed to the received instrumental conception). 
On this view, the value of  reasoning does not lie in its persuasive efficacy, but in its 
reason-giving function. However, a further distinction is to be made between 
people’s concern for justifying their moves and their ability to give effect to this 
concern, that is, their ability to actually reason. Indeed, while without an ability 
to reason we cannot give effect to our concern for justifying our moves, without 
motivations our ability to reason is not useful nor relevant for us. 
If  we ask why we engage in reasoning, the first response, as suggested by the 
definition, is that one must care about having reasons for one’s moves. A capacity 
for concern regarding the justification of  our own moves develops in us when we 
begin to realize that we find it valuable to provide reasons in support of  what we 
say and do. One may imagine that it is in order to give effect to this concern that 
we equip ourselves with a capacity to make premises-conclusions connection, or, at 
least, that we start finding our ability to make premises-conclusions connection 
relevant to our aims, both cognitive and social, and worth developing. Our ability 
to reason, on this view, would then be a response to our concern to provide reasons 
in support of  what we say and do to our interlocutors.  
As the experimental works of  Keith Stanovich and his collaborators suggest, 
people’s reasoning performances cannot take place if  people’s reasoning is not 
activated and supported by their attitudes and dispositions (see West et al. 2008; 
Stanovich 2010). We reason for a variety of  motivations: giving sense to our 
speech or actions, making explicit the premises of  what we say or do, 
collaborating with others, convincing others, or improving our self-image. To 
achieve these and similar aims, one needs to be supported by one’s ability to 
reason. This does not mean, however, that we possess this ability because it helps 
to achieve these aims as well as many others: they are not the reasons why we 
reason as we do. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The great merit of  the argumentative approaches to reasoning we have discussed 
in this paper is that they highlight the limitations of  conceiving of  reasoning as 
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an inner mental activity that makes people get better at thinking on their own, as 
most psychological theories have done in the last thirty years or so. In doing so, 
they have also provided good theoretical grounds and a large body of  evidence in 
support of  the hypothesis that reasoning has its natural environment in 
argumentative contexts. But these approaches do not take into consideration the 
implications that the choice to underline the connection between reasoning and 
argumentation may have for the characterization of  rationality. Focusing on how 
rationality appears to be conceived by these theories, I have argued that, insofar 
as they take reasoning to be a strategic instrument thanks to which we can 
achieve valuable goals, such as convincing others of  a certain claim and defending 
ourselves from their similar attempts, they assume an instrumental conception of  
rationality. This means that in these perspectives giving justificatory support to 
one’s moves is not valuable per se but only insofar as it succeeds in convincing 
other people of  something. However, as these argumentative approaches reduce 
the argumentative function of  reasoning to its capacity to persuade, their way of  
conceiving rationality does not fit the project of  viewing reasoning as basically 
argumentative in nature.  
If, as I have tried to show, the reason-giving function of  reasoning is 
considered to be more fundamental than that of  producing convincing arguments, 
another route can be taken in elaborating the idea that reasoning is argumentative 
in nature. I have indeed presented an argumentative conception of  rationality, 
inspired by Paul Grice’s later works (see Grice 1991; 2001), which, by focusing 
upon the reason-giving function of  reasoning, seems to be able to develop the 
implications of  the connection between reasoning and argumentation more deeply 
than the argumentative approaches have made from an instrumental point of  
view. In the perspective inspired by this argumentative conception of  rationality, 
the function of  reasoning that can be taken to be primary is not that of  producing 
convincing arguments, but that of  justifying one’s claims, opinions and other 
moves, which is sustained by our concern that our moves be justified. In this light, 
while recognizing that the reason-giving function of  reasoning can be exploited to 
achieve many valuable goals, including that of  producing convincing arguments, 
the suggestion that it may have emerged from our deep concern for providing 
reasons for our moves appears to be worth consideration.  
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